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This paper analyses the labour market transitions of older men and women using
data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). I nd large peaks in exit rates
out of employment at ages 60 (women) and 65 (both sexes) which occur in the exact
birthday month. This suggests that pension schemes have strong incentive eects.
Discrete-time hazard regression analysis shows that benets and health status are the
two most important determinants of retirement, with eects that are larger than found
in previous studies for British and US men. When modelling unobserved heterogeneity
I nd that women are twice as likely as men to be `movers' between work and non-work.
Keywords: Labour market transitions, older men and women, BHPS
JEL Classications: J14, J16, J26
R esum e
Nous analysons les transitions sur le march e du travail des travailleurs ^ ag es en nous
appuyant sur les donn ees de l'enqu^ ete longitudinale des m enages britanniques (BHPS).
Nous trouvons des pics de probabilit e de d epart  a la retraite chez les travailleurs ^ ag es
de 60  a 65 ans manifestes durant le mois correspondant exactement  a leur mois de nais-
sance, sugg erant l'existence d'incitatifs importants provenant du syst eme de pension.
Une analyse de r egression d'un mod ele de risques en temps discret montre que l' etat
de sant e et les revenus potentiels ne provenant pas du travail jouent un r^ ole signicatif
dans la d ecision de d epart  a la retraite et que leurs eets sont plus importants que
ne le laissaient pr evoir les  etudes ant erieures portant sur les hommes britanniques et
am ericains. Quand l'h et erog en eit e non observ ee est prise en consid eration, nous trou-
vons que la proportion des femmes quittant le march e du travail est deux fois plus
importante que celle des hommes.
21 Introduction
In most industrialised countries, the average life expectancy has risen substantially while the
average retirement age has fallen. This has increased the number of pensioners each worker
has to nance through public pension systems. The United Kingdom is no exception: as
Banks and Smith (2006: 41) show, the median retirement age has fallen from 65 for the
1910{1914 cohort to 61 for the 1935{1939 cohort. While today there are three working
people for each person aged 65+, this value is projected to fall to two by 2030 (OECD 2000:
213{214). This has led to gaps in government budgets which, in turn, have led to important
changes in the provision of pensions and healthcare: the share of public pension income has
fallen in many countries; the nancing need for healthcare, in particular for long-term care,
will rise sharply.
In the United Kingdom, the level of net social transfers (public pensions and other ben-
ets) as a share of older people's total income has remained relatively constant over the
last decades (although on a lower level than in most countries in continental Europe) while
the share of work income has fallen and the share of capital income (including occupational
pensions) risen (OECD 2000: 44). The GDP share of publicly nanced long-term care is
projected to rise by 15{20% from 2000 to 2020 (OECD 2000: 64).
The important role which occupational pension (OP) schemes play is a particular feature
of the pension provision in the United Kingdom: capital income (which includes income
from OP schemes) contributed less than 30% of pension income in the mid-70s, but more
than 40% in the mid-90s (OECD 2000: 44).1 In my estimation sample from the British
Household Panel Survey (BHPS), 65% of men and 46% of women have contributed to, or
received money from, an OP scheme at least during one wave.
On the micro level, these developments have contributed to higher numbers of people
1For a more detailed discussion of the UK pension system and an overview of its evolution, see Emmerson
(2003).
3without adequate retirement income and healthcare entitlement, whether public or private,
and have led to a great interest in the understanding of older people's labour market partici-
pation and, in particular, their retirement behaviour. When does somebody retire and why?
Who might return to work and why? How are these transitions aected by how much one
could earn in the labour market and by how much income one could have without working?
These are the questions I want to address in this paper.
There are many descriptive papers and policy studies of these issues. There are also two
main types of more analytical approaches: structural models of the retirement decision and
reduced-form hazard regression models which allow for more freedom in the functional form
of agents' underlying economic decision-making.
Lazear (1986) is a valuable survey of structural retirement models. There are (a) purely
theoretical microeconomic models, (b) econometric implementations of life-cycle models, and
(c) dynamic programming models whose parameters can (or could) be tted to real-world
data. Based on assumptions about individuals' utility functions, these models allow analyses
of the eects of exogenous factors on retirement behaviour. For example, Kingston (2000)
shows in a theoretical model of the optimal choice of the date of retirement that people with
higher assets, lower wages, higher disutility of eort, and lower life expectancy will retire
earlier than others.
Hazard regression models (also called duration, survival, or time-to-event models) do not
impose assumptions about utility functions, etc. They are used to model discrete choices
along a time axis. In the case of retirement, this choice is typically between work and
non-work, but can also include a bigger variety of labour market states. While structural
retirement models are usually limited to `the exit' from the labour market (considered to be
a one-o event without any option to return to the labour market), many hazard regression
models also model the return to the labour market. This facilitates a more precise analysis
of how dierent factors aect retirement behaviour, separating exit behaviour from return
4behaviour. In the case of the UK, taking the return into account is particularly important
since previous research has highlighted how rarely older people return to work (cf. Smeaton
and McKay 2003 and Humphrey et al. 2003) which makes it important to understand why
it does or does not occur.
Research on retirement timing using time-to-event analysis has not been very common,
partly because detailed longitudinal data are not available for many countries. Examples
include Blau (1994) about the US (using the Retirement History Survey) and Mastrobuoni
(2000) about Germany (using the German Socio-Economic Panel) and Italy (using the Survey
on Household Income and Wealth). Meghir and Whitehouse (1997), using the Retirement
Survey (RS), wrote the key article about the UK. These studies all emphasise the importance
of pension benets in determining when people retire, especially through their (decreasing)
eect on the probability to return to work.
This paper attempts to build upon this previous research, particularly upon the study by
Meghir and Whitehouse (1997), to extend our knowledge of older men and women's labour
market transitions in the UK. There are four main contributions of my work.
First, while Meghir and Whitehouse (1997), like most previous research, only analyse
men, I compare men and women. This will enable rst comparisons across sexes of the eects
of the explanatory variables. While men start to receive their Basic State Pension starting
from their 65th birthday, women do so starting from their 60th birthday. It is interesting to
see whether this dierence in the state pension age has any eects on older men and women's
labour market behaviour, and if so, which. A related point is that I analyse the exact timing
of transitions in more detail than previously done.
Second, while Meghir and Whitehouse (1997) do not include members of OP schemes in
their regressions (thus excluding 60% of their sample), arguing that OP schemes were too
heterogeneous to be modelled without detailed data about their incentive structures, I try
to keep my sample restriction criteria as small as possible to be able to include this majority
5in my analysis. Since I do not have data on the particular features of individual OP plans,
I compare members and non-members, arguing that even such a simple approach produces
some interesting results.
Third, I employ a wider set of explanatory variables. Since it is well known that health
is an important determinant of retirement, I include more nely graded health variables
than previous studies. I examine the eects of work experience gained in younger years,
which Meghir and Whitehouse (1997) do not. I also include more variables on marital status
and better data on unemployment rates. A discussion of how I improve upon previous
specications is provided in Section 3.
Fourth and related to the previous point, I use a more up-to-date data set (Meghir and
Whitehouse analyse the time period from 1968 to 1989) which is valuable in and of itself
since the labour market behaviour of older Britons has changed a lot over the last decades
(cf. Campbell 1999).
The data which I am using come from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), a
longitudinal general-purpose household survey. The rst wave was carried out in 1991 and
there are currently 14 waves of data available. In this paper, I use waves 1{13. The maturity
of the panel enables us to follow people over a relatively long period in their life. The BHPS
has the advantage of being a rich, current data set with high data quality.2
Section 2 of this paper describes the modelling framework used; Section 3 the data.
Section 4 presents non-parametric empirical transition hazard rates as well as the results
of the hazard regression models, including predicted hazard rates and predicted median
transition ages. Section 5 draws some conclusions.
2There is now also the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA), the rst two waves of which have
been carried out in 2002 and 2004. Wave 3, for which eldwork is currently underway, will include one-o
life history interviews. ELSA is a specialist survey geared towards many of the aspects of this paper, but I
do not use it here since it is still in an early stage in terms of the maturity of the panel dimension.
62 Modelling framework
2.1 Denition of labour market states
I use a discrete-time survival model with two hazards. I study not only the exit from employ-
ment (E) to non-employment (N), but also the return from N to E which is important for
reasons which I have just mentioned. Choosing survival analysis, a reduced-form approach,
enables me to study a host of potential factors|OP membership, the potential incomes in
and out of work, demographic and other personal characteristics, work-related variables,
etc.|simultaneously without having to impose strong structural assumptions.
I treat everybody who reports positive working hours as employed and those who report
zero hours as non-employed. The corresponding transition types are then called EN (if you
change from employment to non-employment from one month to the next) and NE (vice
versa). Men and women are analysed separately.
Self-employed people are kept in the sample since self-employment is an important mode
of employment among UK males and growing in its importance among older Britons. The
self-employed are analysed in the same way as employees. For endogeneity reasons, I will
not use a dummy variable to distinguish between these two groups.
My employment state (E) only includes individuals with positive hours. By contrast,
Peracchi and Welch (1994), who match a number of year-to-year transitions from the US
Current Population Survey (CPS) to analyse the labour market transitions of older men and
women in a simpler methodological framework, regard the unemployed, i.e., those actively
looking for a job, as full-time or part-time employed depending on their previous job. I
justify my approach with the fact that the focus of my paper is really on genuine labour
market activity rather than on search or the receipt of unemployment benets. Furthermore,
nding good measures for whether somebody is `actively searching' is rather dicult.
Treating all those with zero work hours as non-employed follows Blau (1994). Using
7a more aggregated non-employment state (N) rather than distinguishing between separate
labour market states such as retired, unemployed, and out of the labour force is in line with
earlier literature since any denition of `retirement' or `unemployed' is ambiguous. As age
increases, an increasing proportion of those with zero hours (i.e., of those in my state N) will
also be retired according to more subjective measures.
There is a literature on the question whether unemployment and out of the labour force
are dierent from each other. Both Flinn and Heckman (1983) and Jones and Riddell (1999)
nd that they are, with large dierences between the states in the return probabilities to
employment. Nonetheless, in my case, the focus is really on employment as opposed to
everything else (since employment is associated with labour market earnings, while unem-
ployment and out of the labour force are not), so I decided to merge all non-employment
states in accordance with what Blau (1994) and Meghir and Whitehouse (1997) did. A
multi-state analysis would be possible, if the sample includes `enough' events for each tran-
sition, but the parsimonious focus on just two labour market states will make it easier to
identify the principal mechanisms.
Figure 1 plots the proportions of men and women working during the BHPS panel period
(1990{2004) using the denitions just dened. Comparing this gure to Blau's (1994: 122)
data reveals striking dierences between the UK today and the US in the 1960s and 1970s:
Blau (1994) reports that less than 10% of men do not work at age 55, and only approximately
45% at age 65, while in Britain the corresponding gures are 28% and 73%, respectively.
In fact, the labour market participation among US men at age 55 is roughly comparable to
that among UK men at age 40, since the withdrawal process from the labour market starts
much earlier in the UK than in the US. The non-employment share is higher in my UK data
than in Blau's (1994) US data for any given age. For women (whom Blau does not analyse),
non-employment rates are even higher (44% at age 55 and 88% at age 65). In terms of labour
force participation, the UK today is indeed very dierent from the 1960s and the 1970s in
8Figure 1: Shares of men and women working
9the USA.
2.2 The hazard regression model
I assume that the transitions out of and back to employment follow a proportional hazards
model. Since my data are interval-censored, I use a complementary log-log (or cloglog) model
for the hazard regressions.
A proportional hazards model implies that the duration prole of the hazard (the so-
called `baseline hazard') is the same for everybody, with the explanatory variables shifting
this prole upwards or downwards:
(t;x) = 0(t)exp(
0x); (1)
where  is the underlying continuous-time hazard rate, 0 the baseline hazard,  the vector
of coecients, and x the vector of explanatory variables. The proportional hazards property
is intuitively appealing and also has analytical advantages.
I have monthly data on each person's labour market status even though people may make
their transitions on a daily basis. My data are therefore `interval-censored' with monthly
observations which means that I observe data which are grouped into monthly intervals
even though the actual transition process is continuous or discrete with time units smaller
than a month. Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) show that the cloglog model is the interval-
censored discrete-time equivalent of a continuous-time model with the proportional hazards
assumption, with the same coecient vector  as in the continuous-time case.
A result of the above-mentioned analytical advantages of a proportional hazards model
is that each coecient can be transformed to a hazard ratio which is easier to interpret than
the underlying coecient:
10HRxk =
(xk = a + 1)
(xk = a)
= exp(xk): (2)
This is the relative risk associated with a one-unit change in the value of the explanatory
variable xk, all other elements of x held constant. The usual null hypothesis of xk = 0 is of
course equivalent to the null hypothesis of HRxk = 1 since exp(0) = 1. In the discussion of
my regression results, I will talk about hazard ratios most of the time.




(1   hk); (3)
i.e., the fraction of people remaining in the origin state at time j out of all those who were
in the origin state at time i (i.e., i < j). I am using h for the interval-specic (i.e., discrete)
hazard rate.
If there was no unobserved heterogeneity, one could simply estimate two separate discrete-
choice regressions, one for the exit from employment (each observation then corresponding
to a month spent in employment), and one for the return to employment (each observation
representing a month spent in non-employment).
However, it is questionable whether all individuals with the same vector of observed
explanatory variables face the same expected hazard of making a transition in the labour
market. In particular, it seems to be reasonable to assume that there are some individuals
who, due to unobservable factors such as `labour market attachment', are more or less likely
than others to experience a given transition. Ignoring unobserved heterogeneity can lead to
various biases (cf. Jenkins 2005: 81{89). In my case, unobserved heterogeneity means that
I have to take multiple spells into account (one person may make either transition several
times) as well as allow for correlated error terms across the two transitions, estimating them
jointly.
11To model unobserved heterogeneity, I am using the non-parametric approach proposed
by Heckman and Singer (1984). One could also assume a bivariate normal heterogeneity
distribution; however, Abbring and van den Berg (2007) show that in duration models the
heterogeneity distribution usually converges to a Gamma distribution. Also Blau (1994) and
Meghir and Whitehouse (1997) use the approach of Heckman and Singer.
Heckman and Singer present a way of tting a non-parametric distribution of unobserved
heterogeneity where the positions and probabilities of the mass points are determined from
the data themselves, conditional on the number of mass points chosen by the researcher
(typically, one starts o with two mass points and can then try to increase their number,
although convergence is usually only achieved with a small number of mass points). Each
mass point can be interpreted as an estimated xed eect for a group of people who share
a specic unobserved ceteris paribus propensity to make the corresponding transition, and
the probability of each mass point as the estimated share of the sample with this specic
propensity.
With two mass points, there are 2  2 = 4 types of people in this model. However, the
model never converged when allowing for four groups, or when constraining only one of the
four mass point probabilities to zero. I therefore constrained two mass point probabilities to
zero, keeping the remaining two.
My model therefore reduces to the following. There are two types of people, group A
with a corresponding probability , and group B with the probability 1   . Formally, the
transition model for group A can be written as
hi;EN = 1   exp( exp(
0xi)); (4)
hi;NE = 1   exp( exp(
0zi + NE)); (5)
and for group B as
12hi;EN = 1   exp( exp(
0xi + EN)); (6)
hi;NE = 1   exp( exp(
0zi)); (7)
where xi and zi are the vectors of explanatory variables (i.e., demographic and other per-
sonal characteristics as well as variables relating to work, including incentives) and  and
 the corresponding parameter vectors. The  terms are the mass points of the estimated
unobserved heterogeneity distribution; if there were no unobserved heterogeneity, they would
disappear.3
The signs of the two mass points tell us about the two groups. If EN and NE are both
positive, group A exhibits higher labour market attachment (lower exit risk, higher return
probability) and group B lower labour market attachment (higher exit risk, lower return
probability). If EN and NE are both negative, we will have the same two groups, but
vice versa. If EN is positive and NE negative, group A are stayers (lower exit risk, lower
return probability) and group B movers (higher exit risk, higher return probability). If EN
is negative and NE positive, we will again have the same two groups, but vice versa. Other
pairs of the four groups (higher labour market attachment, lower labour market attachment,
stayers, and movers) are not possible due to the choice of the equations in which the two
mass points appear.4
A further issue arising when estimating a transition model with unobserved heterogeneity
is the potential non-randomness of the labour market status of a person's rst spell. In my
case, whether the rst observation of a person in the sample is in employment or in non-
employment may be non-random, because belonging to either one of the two groups of people
3An alternative equivalent notation would be cloglog(hi;EN) = 0xi and cloglog(hi;NE) = 0zi + NE for
the transition model for group A and cloglog(hi;EN) = 0xi + EN and cloglog(hi;NE) = 0zi for group B.
4The general version of the model with all four groups, i.e., without constraining any mass point proba-
bilities, has four rather than just two  parameters, one for each equation in the above scheme. This would
result in all four groups (higher labour market attachment, lower labour market attachment, stayers, and
movers) being estimated.
13just mentioned will also inuence the probability or being employed or non-employed when
rst observed. Ignoring this may bias the estimates. Typically, this problem is tackled
by including a so-called initial conditions equation, an additional equation in the model
which models the probability of being employed when rst observed, allowing for correlation
in unobservables across equations. The above-mentioned model did however not converge
when adding such an initial conditions equation. This is likely to be due to the fact that
the variable summarising somebody's work history between ages 15 and 40 is already a
powerful predictor of the labour market status during a person's rst month in the sample.
Experiments which I carried out with a univariate probit model showed that the employment
experience variable alone can indeed explain 25% of men's variance of the labour market
status when rst observed and 29% of women's.
3 Data, sample selection criteria, and variables
3.1 Data
The main data source for this paper is the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), a
longitudinal survey of households containing a wealth of socio-demographic information as
well as information on many economic variables. The individuals of a representative sample
of 5,500 British households were interviewed in 1991 for the rst time and have since been
followed, with data from 14 waves (annual interviews) currently available (Taylor 2006). I
use waves 1{13 in this paper. Apart from being a rich general-purpose household survey, the
key advantages of the BHPS over other surveys are its data quality and its up-to-dateness.
While Meghir and Whitehouse (1997), using the Retirement Survey (RS), had 1989 as the
last year in their data set, I am able to include data spanning up to 2004 (since 6.4% of
wave-13 interviews were carried out in the early months of 2004).
The BHPS provides us with a large number of individuals and spells: the nal sample
14which I use for my regressions contains 8,361 people (thereof 3,828 men and 4,533 women)
and 14,412 spells (thereof 6,543 men's and 7,869 women's), or slightly less than 700,000
person-months. Meghir and Whitehouse (1997: 330) analyse 2,479 spells of 641 men; Blau
(1994: 121) 16,385 spells of 7,157 men.5
Since information on earnings and benets (and also on wealth, which I am not using in
this paper) is not that detailed in the BHPS, I use the Family Expenditure Survey (FES)
as an auxiliary data source to impute this information. The FES is a series of repeat cross-
sections, with data being available from 1961. It contains detailed information about income
from dierent sources as well as about the receipt of dierent types of benets. Since 1968,
the FES has been carried out each year without any gaps. The last FES was carried out
in 2000{01 after which it merged with the National Food Survey (NFS) to become the
Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS), rst carried out in 2001.
I follow Meghir and Whitehouse (1997) who run earnings and benets regressions using
the FES and then use these coecients to predict lifecycle proles of earnings and benets
for RS respondents. The methodology they use to combine the two data sets is explained
in detail by Arellano and Meghir (1992). As always when using predicted variables as ex-
planatory variables, the hazard regression models using the such `augmented' RS have to
take generated regressor bias into account; otherwise, the standard errors would be under-
estimated. Pagan (1984) oers a comprehensive treatment of this issue. In my case the
prediction of earnings and benets is carried out for the respondents of the BHPS. I am
using the corrected standard error estimator of Murphy and Topel (1985).
5The dierences in the number of spells per person arise from dierences in the denition of what a `spell'
is. In my data, a spell can be either employment or non-employment, in Blau (1994) it can be full-time
employment, part-time employment, or non-employment. Meghir and Whitehouse (1997) do not provide
detailed information about how they dene a spell but looking at Disney, Meghir, and Whitehouse (1994)
suggests that their large number of spells is because they regard job changes as separate spells, even though
they do not analyse these job-to-job transitions.
153.2 Sample selection criteria
The number of sample selection criteria is kept as low as possible, and is the same for the
presentation of empirical hazard rates as well as for my regressions.
First, I restrict the age range I analyse since I focus on older people. I start the observation
window at age 40, disregarding transitions which take place before that age. This is similar
to Meghir and Whitehouse (1997) although they also disregarded the job or unemployment
spell which was underway at a person's 40th birthday. Blau (1994) considered the spell
underway at a person's 55th birthday as well as all subsequent spells. His higher age bound,
55 rather than 40, can be explained by the dierent labour market behaviour of older men
in the USA compared to the UK, as already discussed. Since I observe rst changes in the
empirical exit and entry hazard rates between ages 40 and 50 (cf. Section 4.1), a lower bound
of 40 seems reasonable for my data. I censor spells at age 70 since labour market transitions
become rare beyond that age. This allows me to take a look at ve years beyond men's state
pension age. Meghir and Whitehouse (1997) censor at age 65; Blau (1994) at age 73.
Second, there is a small number of spells (less than 5%) which start before people are
born or when people are still very young. Not correcting this could bias the duration variable
(some women who never worked are reported to be out of the labour force since birth), and
it would bias the variable which I use to summarise a person's work history up to age 40.
These erroneously and/or illogically recorded spells are a genuine artefact of the retrospective
employment histories in the BHPS and not related to the data organisation procedures I used.
I edit all such cases to start with the person's 15th birthday. My employment experience
variable therefore summarises a person's work history from age 15 to age 40. All of this also
aects a few men who already worked prior to their 15th birthday.
Third, I drop people whose birth year and/or month is missing. Thanks to the high data
quality of the BHPS, this criterion drops very few observations (less than 0.1% of spells). The
rationale for dropping people whose birth month is missing, rather than generating a (pseudo-
16)random number, with which I have also experimented, is that I want to analyse whether
transitions out of employment are unusually often observed directly after somebody's 60th
or 65th birthday (so-called `birthday eects'), pointing towards the importance of pension
incentives. Generating missing birth months randomly would blur the analysis of birthday
eects.
Fourth, I only analyse transitions which occur in or after September 1990 (rst wave
minus one year). In other words, I do not analyse transitions which are recorded in the
retrospective work histories. This needs some explanation. In addition to the question
about last year's employment history which is asked in each BHPS wave, BHPS respondents
were also asked to provide a full retrospective work history (as well as other life histories)
in waves 2 and 3. As already mentioned, I use this information to generate a work-history
variable which summarises one's labour market attachment between ages 15 and 40, but I
do not use the retrospective months for the analysis of transitions.6 There is a substantial
literature on survey recall bias in economics, sociology, and statistics (cf. for instance Elias
1997 and Paull 2002 using the BHPS; Morgenstern and Barrett 1974 for a more general
treatment) which suggests that, especially for the lifespan period under consideration in the
present paper, and particularly among older people, there are non-negligible problems with
the precision of retrospective data. Furthermore, and even more importantly, retrospective
data in the BHPS are limited to only a couple of variables. I would for instance not be able
to use health status as an explanatory variable if I used retrospective transitions data.
Fifth and last, I have to drop people for whom I do not observe any work history data be-
fore age 40. This is because I cannot generate a meaningful employment experience variable
for them. Experiments with a dummy variable for missing work history were unsatisfactory.
6As far as the detailed procedure is concerned, I rst use two Stata programmes written by Bardasi
(2002), and updated by myself to cover wave 13, to integrate the retrospective information from waves 2 and
3 into the genuine annual panel information from waves 1 to 13. After generating the work history variable
from this information, I then delete all months earlier than September 1990.
17This criterion drops a bit less than one third of the remaining person-months. Most of the
people dropped here are those who were not present in waves 2 and 3 since this is where
the retrospective life histories were included in the interview, or who did not answer these
questions fully. I do not impute this variable since it is crucial for my analysis. I have
carried out some tabulations showing that the average characteristics of people dropped are
similar to those of people kept which reassures us that this selection criterion is not overly
restrictive.
Summing up, I look at all transitions taking place after August 1990 made by people




I am interested in the length of employment and non-employment spells. I operationalise
the analysis by studying month-to-month changes in the labour market status. I therefore
analyse EN and NE transitions as mentioned earlier on.
Similarly to Blau (1994), I ll labour market status gaps of a length of up to two years,
assuming midway changes (if the gap length is odd, I create a pseudo-random variable to
decide with which information to ll the middle month). Three examples follow. If somebody
is observed working in August 1995 and not working in November 1997, the gap between these
months is not lled since the gap length exceeds 24 months. If somebody is observed working
in August 1995 and not working in November 1995, `working' is imputed for September and
`not working' for October (even gap length). If somebody is observed working in August
1995 and not working in October 1995, a pseudo-random number is generated to decide
whether to impute `working' or `not working' for September (middle month of a gap with
18odd length). The rst labour market status observed is used to ll all previous months of a
person for which the labour market status is missing; the last one for all subsequent missing
months, again up to a gap length of 24 months. An example: If somebody enters the sample
in August 1994, has twelve months for which the labour market status is missing, and is then
observed working in August 1995, the months from August 1994 to July 1995 are imputed
with `working'.
3.3.2 Explanatory variables
Although I am estimating reduced-form models of older people's transitions out of and back
to employment, job search models which have attracted a lot of attention in the unem-
ployment literature since the 1970s can be useful in motivating the explanatory variables
used. Job search models typically explain unemployment durations and reservation wages
with individuals who maximise their utility over an innite horizon, conditional on the wage
distribution. Neumann (1999) gives an excellent survey of empirical implementations of job
search models using survival analysis.
Much of the job search literature has focused on duration dependence and unemployment
insurance, so it is natural to have elapsed spell duration and the benet entitlement among
my explanatory variables. Also age should be included since we are interested in people who
are approaching the end of their working phase. Some measure of the unemployment rate
will enable us to evaluate labour market tightness. We need to nd something similar to the
wage distribution used in job search models to measure employment prospects. Similarly,
we should also include some pre-determined measure of individuals' past work experience
since this will have an impact on human capital as well as measuring attachment to the
labour force. Demographic variables related to household/family circumstances could also
be interesting, although we have to be cautious because of potential endogeneity. Lastly, we
should include information about each person's health for obvious reasons, and information
19about OP membership for reasons which I discussed in the introduction to this paper.
In what follows, I will now go on to present the specic explanatory variables used in my
regression analysis.
 Elapsed spell duration (in months)
 Age (in months, minus 479)
 Age 60 dummy = 1 if month of 60th birthday or the month thereafter, 0 otherwise
 Age 65 dummy = 1 if month of 65th birthday or the month thereafter, 0 otherwise
 Age (in months, minus 479)  Duration interaction variable
 Marital status
 Health status
 Occupational pension (OP) dummy = 1 if ever contributed to or received money from
an OP scheme, 0 otherwise
 Child dummy = 1 if ever had a child, 0 otherwise
 Employment experience share = months working between ages 15 and 40 divided
by total number of months in that person's work history in that age range (using
retrospective as well as panel elements)
 Regional unemployment rate
 Predicted (log) income in employment (`earning power')
 Predicted (log) income out of employment (`benet entitlement')
20The specication of elapsed spell duration duration, included in levels as well as
squared and divided by 1000, is in line with the literature on older people's labour market
transitions. I also carried out experiments with dummy variables for certain durations (such
as one dummy variable for a one-month duration and one for a duration of more than one
year, as in Meghir and Whitehouse, 1997) but they were not statistically signicant at any
reasonable level.
Similarly, I use age as well as its squared value divided by 1000. Again, this is in
line with the literature. In addition, to allow for birthday eects as discussed earlier on, I
include two age dummy variables for the two exit peaks at ages 60 and 65. Unfortunately, the
maximum likelihood model with unobserved heterogeneity does not converge if one includes
separate dummy variables for the two birthday months 60 and 65 as well as the 2  2 =
4 surrounding months. Therefore, and since some regressions which I have run without
unobserved heterogeneity have shown that for women, also the coecients of the dummy
variables for the months directly after these two birthday months are statistically signicant,
I include two variables which equal 1 if the current month is the corresponding birthday
month itself or the month directly thereafter.
The coecients of age and age squared, as well as of all the other explanatory vari-
ables, are hardly aected by whether one includes such birthday dummy variables or not,
or by which ones one includes (just two dummy variables for the 60th and 65th birthdays,
six dummy variables when also covering the surrounding months, etc.). Without birthday
dummy variables, the spikes caused by birthday eects are masked completely.
Finally, I also include an age  duration interaction variable (divided by 1000). This
variable allows for some interaction between age and duration which may be reasonable in
terms of economic theory. The coecient size is small, but it turns out to be statistically
signicant. Therefore, the coecients of the other age and duration variables are not aected
very much by including this interaction term.
21Age and duration can be identied separately because of the multiple-spell structure of
the data. If we analysed a single event which can only occur once, such as death, age and
duration would simply be linear transformations of one another. In my analysis however,
there are two types of events (exit and return), both of which can occur repeatedly. If
somebody stops employment and makes an exit to non-employment, the duration variable
will be reset to one while the age variable will of course continue to `tick'. Therefore, it is the
multiple-spell structure of the data which enables separate identication of age and duration
eects.
I use four marital status dummy variables: divorced; married; separated; widowed.
The base category is never married. Gaps in this variable are lled in the same way as gaps
in labour market status (cf. Section 3.3.1).
The health status variables use information from the following BHPS question: Please
think back over the last 12 months about how your health has been. Compared to people of
your own age, would you say that your health has on the whole been... The answer Excellent
forms my base category, and I have four dummy variables for the remaining answers Good,
Fair, Poor, and Very Poor. Gaps in this variable are again lled in the same way as gaps in
the variable on labour market status.
The regional unemployment rate uses information about the claimant count rate in
twelve regions of the UK obtained from National Statistics: East, East Midlands, London,
North East, Northern Ireland, Northwest and Merseyside, Scotland, Southeast, Southwest,
Wales, West Midlands, and Yorkshire and Humberside. I use the not seasonally adjusted
across-sex time series.7
7The corresponding data series are called DPDD, DPAN, DPDE, DPDA, DPAV, IBWD, DPAU, DPDF,
DPAQ, DPAT, DPAR, and DPAM. They are available from http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/
tsdintro.asp The data for one region (Northwest and Merseyside) are missing between September 1990
(the rst `BHPS month') and December 1993. I apply the time trend of all of England (time series VASS) to
ll this gap, scaling the values so that my predicted value for Northwest and Merseyside for the rst month
in the data (January 1994) is equivalent to the actual one.
22I also experimented with the relative regional unemployment rate, i.e., dividing the
monthly claimant count rates for each region by that region's average over the time pe-
riod under consideration (September 1990 to May 2004). This would eliminate the region
xed eects which might be useful since the region of residence could be deemed endogenous.
The sign and statistical signicance of the unemployment variable were not aected by this,
and all the other variables had almost the same coecients. I therefore went back to using
the `normal' (absolute) regional unemployment rate since the hazard ratios for this variable
are easier to interpret.
`Earning power' and `benet entitlement' are predicted values of each person's indi-
vidual incomes in and out of the labour market. They include all types of incomes applicable,
but for simplicity I shall refer to them as earning power and benet entitlement. They have
a similar purpose as the wage distribution and replacement ratio variables typically used in
the job search literature, as already mentioned.
I use predicted rather than actual values for two reasons: rst, to overcome potential
endogeneity; second, because at one point in time a person can only be either in employment
or in non-employment. In line with the literature, I use individual rather than household
or family income, thereby ignoring household eects. An interesting aspect would be to
test in how far predicted household income plays a role for these transitions. Because of
endogeneities, this might be particularly important when analysing the joint labour market
behaviour of older couples which has not yet been done with UK data.
I use the FES rather than the BHPS to predict these two variables because information
on earnings and especially on benets is much more detailed in the FES than in the BHPS,
which is likely to make them more reliable. I drop FES respondents who are younger than
40 or older than 70, i.e., I use the same age group as for my transition regressions. I adjust
for ination using the Retail Price Index of National Statistics.8 My two income variables
8http://www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/tsdataset.asp?vlnk=229 The exact time series used is CHAW
23are measured in January 2004 prices.
Separately for men and for women, I regress the natural logarithm of employees' total
income on calendar time (in months since 1900), age, and occupational dummies to estimate
the predicted earning power, and the natural logarithm of non-employed people's total in-
come on calendar time and age to estimate the predicted benet entitlement.9 As in Meghir
and Whitehouse (1997), benet entitlement is therefore identied through policy changes
over time. During the time period my analysis covers, such policy changes included the
introduction of the Minimum Income Guarantee in 1997 or its replacement by the Pension
Credit in 2003. I run these auxiliary regressions using the natural logarithm of the two
income variables as the dependent variables rather than levels to yield a better t and ad-
dress potential heteroskedasticity. I present the results of these regressions in Table 4 in the
Appendix.
One problem might be a correlation of the variance matrices of the earnings and benets
regressions caused by households in which there are workers as well as non-workers. This
could lead to biases in my predictions, and would complicate the Murphy-Topel standard
error correction for generated regressor bias (cf. Appendix). To overcome this problem, I
generate a pseudo-random variable for each `mixed' household to decide whether to include
its worker(s) or its non-worker(s) in my auxiliary regressions. This should eliminate the
correlation of the two variance matrices.
Since this could introduce some non-randomness because of the dierent treatment of
larger households, I also experimented with deciding for each household (i.e., also for house-
holds where there are only workers or only non-workers) whether to use it in the earnings
or the benets regression. This would of course decrease sample size a lot (because house-
which is a monthly index number which includes all items, i.e., also housing, indirect taxes, and mortgage
interest payments. I change the base month from January 1987 to January 2004.
9There are two total income variables in the FES, `normal total personal gross income' and `current total
personal gross income'; I use the former to smooth transitory income variation.
24holds which were assigned to be included in the earnings regression but which only have
non-workers and vice versa would have to be dropped). However, the results of the three
methods (include everybody; include only either workers or either non-workers in `mixed'
households; assign households randomly to either regression and then drop accordingly) were
so similar that I decided to employ the random dropping only for `mixed' households (the
correlations of earnings predicted using the three dierent methods were always higher than
0.99, similarly for benets).
Since the predictors, calendar time, age, and occupation, are available in exactly the same
way in the BHPS as they are in the FES, I use the coecients of the auxiliary regressions
to predict earning power and benet entitlement for each BHPS respondent. In contrast
to Blau (1994) and Meghir and Whitehouse (1997), I use the natural logarithm of the
income variables in the transition regressions (rather than levels). This has two major
advantages. First, it simplies making statements about the elasticities of making a certain
transition with respect to the two income variables and second, it enables us to test the
replacement rate hypothesis, i.e., whether log earnings and log benets have equally large
coecients, but with dierent sign. The replacement rate is dened as R =
benefits
earnings, therefore
ln(R) = ln(benefits)   ln(earnings).
Missings in the occupational dummy variable in the BHPS (which is one of my predictors)
are lled as described for the marital status dummy variables. For people for whom I never
observe an occupation in the BHPS, i.e., for people who never worked during the panel
period, the earning power is set equal to the base category (non-skilled manual).
Predicting the two income variables gives rise to an identication issue similar to that of
any instrumental variables approach, i.e., there have to be some predictors in the two income
regressions which are assumed not to have direct eects on the transition equations; only
indirect eects via the two income variables. That is why I do not use calendar time and
occupation in the transition equations; I am assuming that calendar time and occupation do
25Variable Men Women
Failure 0.0073 0.0075





Age in months minus 479 137.2959 141.3131
(Age in years) 51.3580 51.6928
Duration 47.4213 46.9202
Employment experience 0.9068 0.6227
Ever had child 0.7654 0.8198
Ever had OP 0.6497 0.4633
(Excellent health) 0.2579 0.2249
Good health 0.4502 0.4501
Fair health 0.1990 0.2216
Poor health 0.0752 0.0813
Very poor health 0.0177 0.0221
Regional unemployment rate 6.4662 6.5982
Weekly earnings 399.9163 202.8809
Weekly benets 138.3641 58.1184
Person-months 310,287 369,193
Persons 3,828 4,533
Table 1: Sample means (person-averages rather than person-month averages for the three
time-constant variables). Earnings and benets in January 2004 pounds.
not inuence the transition hazards directly, only via earnings and benets (and of course
via the regional unemployment rate). I use age in the prediction as well as in the transition
equations.
In Table 1, I present the averages of the dependent and explanatory variables for my nal
estimation sample (variables not used in my regressions are in parentheses). I am reporting
person-month averages except for the three time-constant variables employment experience,
ever had child, and ever had OP, for which I am reporting person-averages.
How does my specication compare to those of Blau (1994) and Meghir and Whitehouse
(1997)? Overall, it is closer to the parsimonious specication of Meghir and Whitehouse
26rather than to the huge model which Blau estimates. However, compared to both Meghir
and Whitehouse and Blau, I use more detailed information on health (four dummies vs two or
one in Meghir and Whitehouse, one in Blau), marital status (four dummies vs none in Meghir
and Whitehouse, one in Blau), and unemployment (regional rate vs national). Furthermore,
I use three time-constant variables to capture people's OP membership and their parental
and work histories. I do not use education since it is not statistically signicant when
using occupation to predict earning power. Therefore, I decided to use a more parsimonious
specication of the transition equations without education variables.
4 Results
4.1 Empirical transition hazard rates by various characteristics
4.1.1 Methodology
This part of the paper reports conditional transition probabilities (`empirical hazard rates')
between the two labour market states depending on the age of the person. I calculate them
separately for dierent groups of people depending on their sex and OP status.
Separating these calculations by sex will help to see whether the dierence in the state
pension age (65 for men, 60 for women) leads to dierences in labour market behaviour.
Dierentiating between OP members and non-members allows to check whether the phe-
nomenon observed by Meghir and Whitehouse (1997), that men who are OP members have
a higher return probability than male non-members, can still be observed in more recent
data, and whether there is any dierence for women in that respect.
These descriptive devices shall be used to point towards interesting features of the data
which warrant further investigation in the multivariate parametric analysis which follows.
My denition of the hazard rate is analogous to the Kaplan-Meier hazard, with the
27important dierence that age rather than duration is the analysis time. The annual EN
hazard `at' age 65 (denoted by hEN
65;a, with the a subscript for `annual') is the number of
people who made a transition from employment to non-employment between the month
directly before their 65th birthday and twelve months thereafter (EN780;792, as 6512 = 780
and 780+12 = 792), divided by the risk set.10 The risk set consists of the number of people in
state E directly before their 65th birthday (E780) minus half of those censored between the two







I also compute 95% condence intervals for my age-dependent `hazard' h. These are
given by






where, in analogy to Greenwood's (1926) formula,  1() is the inverse cumulative standard
normal probability distribution function and f the numbers of failures (EN780;792 in the
previous example).
I talk about dierences in the hazard rates being `statistically signicant' if the corre-
sponding 95% condence intervals do not overlap.
4.1.2 A First Overview: Annual Transition Hazards for Men and Women
The exit hazard, in Figure 2, is very similar for men and for women, with three exceptions:
the peak at age 65 is higher for men than for women, the peak at age 60 for women than for
men (with these two dierences being statistically signicant), and in general women's exit
10By analogy, the formula for the monthly age-dependent hazard `at' age 65 (hEN
65;m) uses 780;781 subscripts.
11Actuarial adjustment therefore deals with the fact that some people who are observed at the starting
age are not observed anymore twelve months later. Subtracting 50% of the censored observations from the
risk set assumes that the density of censoring over time is symmetric.
28Figure 2: Annual EN hazard by sex
hazard is slightly higher at older ages than men's (although this dierence is not statistically
signicant). Men's age-60 peak is only very minor.
In numbers, the annual hazard of stopping to work `at' age 65 is 44.97% for men (3.81
times larger than the average of the two surrounding years) and 26.99% (2.08 times larger)
for women. At age 60, the corresponding gures are 8.79% (1.52 times larger) for men and
22.30% (2.68 times larger) for women.
The return hazard, in Figure 3, is statistically signicantly higher for men than for women
up to age 55 and almost completely the same for the two sexes thereafter.
Both for men as well as for women, there are no statistically signicant dierences in the
transition hazards depending on whether or not they ever had children. This is interesting
because one might have suspected that women who had children could have dierent em-
ployment patterns later during their life. However, women with children may of course follow
a dierent distribution across labour market states compared to women without children.
29Figure 3: Annual NE hazard by sex
4.1.3 Assessing birthday eects: monthly transition hazards for men and women
An interesting question is whether there is heaping of transitions at certain ages (so-called
`birthday eects'), or whether transitions are evenly spread over the year. This is because
birthday eects at ages which play important roles in a country's pension system could
indicate incentive eects of the pension system. Blau (1994) addressed this question using
quarterly hazard rates to analyse US data while Meghir and Whitehouse (1997) for the UK
only addressed it implicitly when referring to steep parts in the survivor function at age 65
(keep in mind that they analysed men only). In my data, such steep parts can be seen in
Figure 1 at age 65 for men and at age 60 for women.
Examining the monthly hazard rates in my own data reveals that birthday eects are
important in the UK. A man who is employed directly before his 65th birthday has a 45.38%
risk of stopping to work within one month (12.93 times larger than the average of the two
surrounding months), a woman 19.49% (4.05 times larger). For the 60th birthday these
gures are 3.25% (6.08 times larger) for men and 11.78% (4.53 times larger) for women.
When looking at quarterly hazard rates it can be seen that for British men, birthday eects
30are approximately twice as large as Blau (1994) found for the USA.
4.1.4 Annual transition hazards by Occupational Pension membership
Figure 4: Annual EN hazard by OP status for men
Looking at men in Figures 4 and 5, having ever been member of an OP scheme is not
associated with the exit rate from employment, but it does increase the return hazard up to
age 55 compared to non-members. This is consistent with Meghir and Whitehouse (1997:
332). OP members also have a higher age-65 exit peak, but the dierence is not statistically
signicant.
For women, in Figures 6 and 7, we observe a similar pattern. The return hazard for
OP members is higher than for non-members up to age 55, and the dierence is statisti-
cally signicant (and larger than for men). Furthermore, female OP members have more
pronounced exit peaks at ages 60 and 65 than non-members, but these dierences are again
not statistically signicant.
31Figure 5: Annual NE hazard by OP status for men
Figure 6: Annual EN hazard by OP status for women
32Exit hazard coecients Men Women
Without UH With UH Without UH With UH
Married  0.2501*  0.1935  0.3234*  0.4133***
Separated  0.2664  0.2669  0.0390  0.2386
Divorced  0.0719 0.0249  0.2480  0.3066*
Widowed  0.2833  0.2095  0.2184  0.2093
Age 0.0077*** 0.0054** 0.0045*** 0.0016
Age squared  0.0136***  0.0076  0.0065 0.0033
Age = 60 0.9585*** 1.0027*** 2.1644*** 2.1809***
Age = 65 3.0484*** 3.0714*** 2.1399*** 2.1600***
Duration  0.0545***  0.0503***  0.0623***  0.0569***
Duration squared 0.0967*** 0.0844*** 0.1200*** 0.1077***
Age  duration 0.0522*** 0.0538*** 0.0616*** 0.0646***
Employment exp.  1.3094***  1.1686***  0.8023***  0.7567***
Ever had child  0.0986  0.1173  0.3245***  0.3061***
Ever had OP 0.2104*** 0.2265***  0.1680***  0.1690**
Good health 0.1434* 0.1464** 0.0265 0.0453
Fair health 0.2560*** 0.2510*** 0.4133*** 0.4330***
Poor health 1.0171*** 1.0325*** 0.9442*** 1.0106***
Very poor health 1.2938*** 1.4155*** 1.1238*** 1.1508***
Unemployment rate  0.0658***  0.0346  0.0961***  0.0672***
Earnings  0.5899***  0.5905***  0.5633***  0.5200***
Benets  0.0138 0.1495  0.0128  0.2615
# of person-months 232,741 see below 212,469 see below
Log likelihood  7992.5608 see below  8727.0997 see below
Return hazard coecients Men Women
Without UH With UH Without UH With UH
Married 0.1985 0.2394  0.5307**  0.4362
Separated  0.0489  0.1727  0.3227  0.2821
Divorced 0.0161 0.0877  0.1535  0.0246
Widowed  0.1910  0.0003  0.4575  0.3294
Age 0.0071 0.0069 0.0056 0.0035
Age squared  0.0422**  0.0392*  0.0412**  0.0320**
Duration  0.0540**  0.0251  0.0279* 0.0019
Duration squared 0.3298* 0.2537 0.2740*** 0.2375**
Age  duration  0.0056  0.0314  0.0280  0.0614***
Employment exp. 1.3437*** 1.2625*** 0.8058*** 0.7578***
Ever had child 0.0435 0.1164 0.3252*** 0.3506
Ever had OP 0.0762 0.1838 0.4291*** 0.4373***
Good health 0.0503 0.1047 0.0139 0.0105
Fair health  0.3208**  0.2759*  0.2872*  0.2903**
Poor health  1.3127***  1.2826***  1.0996***  1.1030***
Very poor health  1.4884***  1.3899***  1.8703***  1.8907***
Unemployment rate  0.0966  0.1076  0.1995***  0.1925***
Earnings 0.6268*** 0.6638*** 0.6219*** 0.6573*
Benets  1.4606***  1.6306***  1.4256***  1.3130***
# of person-months 77,546 310,287 156,724 369,193
Log likelihood  3738.9565  11630.479  5634.803  14226.431
UH:  (cf. text) 0.0888*** 0.8141***
UH: EN mass point  1.4775*** 1.4303***
UH: NE mass point 1.3810***  1.4009***
Table 2: Regression coecients without & with unobserved heterogeneity (UH).
***: Statistically signicant at the 1% level; **: 5% level; *: 10% level (Murphy-Topel
standard errors; cf. Appendix).
33Figure 7: Annual NE hazard by OP status for women
4.2 Hazard regression analysis
Table 2 presents the coecients of the exit and return regressions. It contains four columns,
the rst for men without unobserved heterogeneity (a standard cloglog model with the stan-
dard errors adjusted for clustering by person, allowing for some adjustment to deal with
the fact that we observe most people for more than one month), the second for men with
unobserved heterogeneity, the third for women without unobserved heterogeneity, and the
fourth for women with unobserved heterogeneity. All the standard errors have been corrected
for generated regressor bias using the estimator by Murphy and Topel (1985) which is also
discussed in Greene (2003) and Hardin (2002). This estimator is described in the Appendix.
My discussion of the results in this section will focus on the model with unobserved
heterogeneity. There are not many dierences between the two models but some exist,
and since the unobserved heterogeneity parameters all turn out to be highly statistically
signicant these dierences could be crucial.
For reasons which I have already mentioned I will discuss hazard ratios (cf. Section 2.2)
rather than coecients. I will also refer to Figures 10 to 21 which show predicted hazard
34rates, and to Table 3 which shows the median transition ages computed from the predicted
survivor function in several alternative scenarios. The advantage of these gures and this
table is that they make it possible to compare the importance of dummy and continuous
variables; for continuous variables, the hazard ratio alone is not very helpful since it does
not tell us what the mean and standard deviation of the corresponding variable are. The
combination of hazard ratios, predicted hazard rates, and predicted median exit and return
ages will enable us to assess which of the explanatory variables have the largest impact.
Let us now examine the regression results in detail.
Most of the marital status coecients are statistically insignicant. The only two vari-
ables which are statistically signicant are married and divorced in women's exit regression:
married women have a 34% lower exit risk than never married, separated, and widowed
women; divorced women a 26% lower exit risk. This may again be a selection eect since
married women may be less likely to work in the rst place.
The eects of age and duration are not so easy to assess since both variables appear in
levels as well as squared, plus there is also the interaction term. One way of analysing the
impact of age and duration is to keep one variable constant at a certain level and to vary the
other. Doing this reveals an important dierence between men and women: the eects of
age and duration on exit are almost the same for the two sexes while their eects on return
are very dierent.
Varying age while keeping duration constant at its sex-specic average shows that ceteris
paribus, increasing age continuously increases the exit risk for both men and women. At age
40, the combined exit hazard ratio of the age and duration variables is 1.0 for both men
and women, at age 50 it is 2.3 for men and 1.8 for women, at age 60 (without taking into
account the birthday eect dummy variable which I will cover later on) 4.4 for men and 3.7
for women, at age 65 (again without taking into account the birthday eect dummy variable)
5.5 for men and 5.4 for women. Thereafter, the exit hazard ratio of women is higher than
35that of men.
Figure 8: Combined ceteris paribus eect of age and duration on the predicted monthly NE
hazard by age, holding duration constant at its sex-specic average
Doing the same for the return to the labour market as shown in Figure 8 shows that the
ceteris paribus impact of age on the return hazard (again holding duration constant at its
sex-specic average) is inversely U-shaped: the age eect on the return probability reaches
its maximum at age 46 for men and at age 41 for women. At age 70 the sizes of the eect
for men and for women meet, but up to that age, the age variable has a less negative eect
on men's than on women's return hazard. The dierence is largest at age 51 where men's
combined hazard ratio of the age and duration variables is 1.0 and women's 0.6.
Varying duration while keeping age constant at its sex-specic average shows that ceteris
paribus, the risk of exiting work falls as duration increases. The eect is virtually identical
for men and women. When duration is 1 (i.e., the individual is in the rst month of his or
her employment spell), men's combined hazard ratio of the age and duration variables is 1.0,
36women's 0.9. After one more year in employment (i.e., a value of the duration variable of
13), this hazard ratio has already fallen to 0.5 for both sexes, after another additional year
to 0.3 (men) and 0.2 (women), respectively.
Figure 9: Combined ceteris paribus eect of age and duration on the predicted monthly NE
hazard by duration, holding age constant at its sex-specic average
Lastly, we can do the same for the eect of duration on return as shown in Figure 9. As
for age, I again nd that the dierence between men and women is mostly due to the return
behaviour, not due to the exit behaviour: for men, the ceteris paribus eect of duration on
return is falling, on women somewhat increasing. This means that the longer a man is out
of employment, the lower his ceteris paribus probability to come back to work. For women,
the opposite is true. When duration is 1, the combined hazard ratio of the age and duration
variables is 1 for both men and women, one year later it is 0.7 for men and 1.0 for women,
another year later 0.5 for men and 1.1 for women.
So far, I have shown that the eects of age and duration on exit are very similar for
37the two sexes, but their eects on return are quite dierent. Now we also need to take a
look at the two birthday eect dummy variables which appear in the exit regression, one
for the month of the 60th birthday or the month thereafter, and one for the month of the
65th birthday or the month thereafter. The coecient sizes are huge and markedly bigger
than the size of any other dummy variable. At a man's 60th birthday, the exit risk is 2.7
times higher than can be explained by all the other variables. At a man's 65th birthday, the
hazard ratio is 21.6 (sic). For women, as could already be suspected from Section 4.1.3 which
discussed evidence for birthday eects in the empirical hazard rates, the eects of the 60th
and the 65th birthday are much more similar to each other than for men; the corresponding
hazard ratios are 8.9 and 8.7, respectively. This shows that even after controlling for a
number of important control variables, birthday eects are an important phenomenon in the
labour market behaviour of older Britons.
As expected, employment experience reduces the exit risk and increases the return prob-
ability for both men and women. The eects are statistically signicant: comparing a man
who has always worked when observing his work history between ages 15 and 40 to a man
who never has, the former has a 69% lower exit risk than the latter, and a 3.5 times as large
return probability. Prima facie, this looks huge, but one needs to take into account that the
variation in work experience is not that large: as we know from Table 1, the mean value for
men is 0.9068 (90.68%); the standard deviation is 0.2306. Table 3 shows that reducing men's
employment experience by one third lowers the median exit age of those who were working
at age 40 from 53.6 by 3.3 to 50.3, and increases the median return age of those who were
not working at age 40 from 42.6 by 1.2 to 43.8.
Comparing a woman who always worked to one who never worked, the former has a 53%
lower exit risk than the latter, and a 2.1 times larger return probability. This raw eect
is smaller for women than for men. Looking at Table 3 again shows that also the eects
of a relative change in the employment experience variable (which takes into account that
38women's employment experience has a lower mean than men's) are smaller for women than
for men.
Having ever had a child has a statistically signicant eect on women's exit risk: women
with a child or children have a 26% lower exit risk than women without. This eect is
statistically signicant at the 1% level. Table 3 shows that the median exit age of women
who were working at age 40 is 51.3 if they ever had a child and 2.5 years lower (48.8) if
they never had. Having ever had children does not have statistically signicant eects on
women's return probability or on men's transition probabilities.
Figure 10: Ceteris paribus eect of not being an OP members compared to being one on the
predicted monthly NE hazard for men by age
Having ever been member of an OP scheme shows the expected eects for women: it
lowers their exit risk by 16% and it increases their return probability by 55% (both statisti-
cally signicant). Figure 11 shows a hypothetical counterfactual related to women's return
probability: the thick line represents the predicted return probability of women who are OP
members, with the values of the other explanatory variables equal to those observed among
39Figure 11: Ceteris paribus eect of not being an OP members compared to being one on the
predicted monthly NE hazard for women by age
women who have the corresponding age, are out of work, and OP members. The thin dashed
line plots the hypothetical counterfactual of making these women non-OP members, keeping
the values of all other explanatory variables the same. In terms of the median transition
ages shown in Table 3, this means that making women who are OP members non-members
decreases their median exit age by 1.5 years and increases their median return age by 0.9
years.
However, the eects of OP membership are less straightforward for men. The eect on
the return probability is not statistically signicant (cf. Figure 10), and moreover, men who
are OP members have an exit risk 25% higher than non-members (statistically signicant at
the 1% level). This translates into the prediction that men who are not OP members exit
the labour market 2.1 years later than members (Table 3). This nding is dierent to what
Meghir and Whitehouse (1997) found when plotting employment survivor functions of men
with and without OP schemes and may warrant further examination. The reason could, for
40instance, be in wealth versus income eects.
Figure 12: Ceteris paribus eects of health compared to being in good health on the predicted
monthly EN hazard for men by age
Health status is found to be one of the most important determinants of older people's
labour market transitions (Figures 12 to 15). In three out of the four equations, being in
good or excellent health does not make any statistically signicant dierence. However, as
we can see from the gures, being in poor or very poor health does make a huge dierence.
Men in poor health have a 2.8 times larger exit risk than men in excellent health; for women,
the corresponding hazard ratio is almost the same (2.7). Being in very poor health further
increases this risk: for men, from 2.8 times larger to 4.1 times larger, for women, from 2.7
times larger to 3.2 times larger.
For the return, we see similarly huge eects. Men in poor health have a 72% lower return
probability than men in good or excellent health; for women it is 67% lower. Being in very
poor health further reduces the chances to return to work: men in very poor health have
41Figure 13: Ceteris paribus eects of health compared to being in good health on the predicted
monthly NE hazard for men by age
42Figure 14: Ceteris paribus eects of health compared to being in good health on the predicted
monthly EN hazard for women by age
43Figure 15: Ceteris paribus eects of health compared to being in good health on the predicted
monthly NE hazard for women by age
44a 75% lower return probability than men in good or excellent health; for women it is even
85% lower.
Of course this also translates into correspondingly huge eects on the median transition
ages shown in Table 3. One particularly striking result: for women who were not working
at age 40 and continuously in very poor health, I predict only 39.9% to return to work by
age 70. Therefore, I cannot even calculate a median return age for this group.
The regional unemployment rate has statistically signicant eects on women's labour
market transitions. Unfortunately, these are not so easy to interpret: when regional unem-
ployment is high, women make less transitions in either direction. For men, there are no
statistically signicant eects.
As expected, higher earnings lower one's exit risk and increase one's return probability.
This is also in accordance with theoretical results shown in microeconomic optimal retirement
decision models such as the one already mentioned earlier on by Kingston (2000). The eects
are statistically signicant but not that large. As can be seen from Table 3, increasing
predicted earnings by one third increases men's median exit age by 1.6 years (from 53.6 to
55.2) and women's by 1.2 years (from 51.2 to 52.4). It also reduces the median return age
by 0.5 years for men (from 42.6 to 42.1) and by 0.6 years for women (from 43.3 to 42.7).
The eects of benets are quite dierent: they do not have any statistically signicant
eects on exit, but they do have important eects on return, as shown in Figures 16 and 17
which plot the eects of reducing benets by one third. The median return age is reduced
by 1.3 years for men (from 42.6 to 41.3) and by 1.5 years for women (from 42.6 to 41.1).
This means that such a reduction by one third halves the median duration out of work for
men; the eect is similarly large for women.
The eects of earnings and benets which I nd are bigger than in Blau (1994) for the
US and Meghir and Whitehouse (1997) for the UK. For example, Meghir and Whitehouse
(1997: 347), when using the model with unobserved heterogeneity, nd that the elasticity
45Figure 16: Ceteris paribus eect of reducing predicted benets by one third on the predicted
monthly NE hazard for men by age
Figure 17: Ceteris paribus eect of reducing predicted benets by one third on the predicted
monthly NE hazard for women by age
46of exit from the labour market with respect to earnings is  0:54 and the elasticity of entry
to the labour market with respect to benets is  0:36. In my analysis, the corresponding
gures are  0:59 and  1:63, respectively. For women, the elasticities which I nd are only
slightly lower ( 0:52 and  1:31, respectively). Blau (1994: 142, 144) nds hardly any eects
of the predicted full-time wage rate. He does nd large eects of social security benets;
however, they are still smaller than the ones I nd.
Putting together what I have said about the eects of earnings and benets and looking
at the condence intervals of the coecient estimates, we can already suspect that the
replacement ratio hypothesis does not hold. Indeed formal tests of benefits =  earnings
were always rejected, for men as well as for women and without UH as well as with UH.
Summing up, we can keep in mind that apart from age, where I nd huge peaks at ages
65 (for both sexes) and 60 (for women), health and benets seem to be the most important
determinants of labour market transitions quantitatively. The impact of non-labour income
on the return probability could well warrant further examination.
Similar to Meghir and Whitehouse (1997), introducing unobserved heterogeneity does not
lead to systematic changes in the coecients, but there are a couple of changes with respect
to statistical signicance. I do not formally test for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity
(Meghir and Whitehouse develop a score test of unobserved heterogeneity for multiple spell
models), but the mass point probabilities and positions are always statistically signicant at
the 1% level.
The estimated positions of the mass points are virtually the same for the two sexes
(they have opposite signs but the corresponding mass point probabilities are also almost
the inverse of each other). In terms of hazard ratios, movers among men have a 4.4 times
higher exit risk than male stayers, and a 4 times higher return probability.12 Among women,
121=exp( 1:4775) gives the exit hazard ratio of male movers compared to male stayers, exp(1:3810) the
return hazard ratio.
47the corresponding hazard ratios are 4.2 and 4.1.13 8.88% of men and 18.59% of women are
movers, the remainder (91.12% of men and 81.41% of women) stayers. The fact that there
are twice as many movers among women as among men, which is statistically signicant at
any level, may be interesting as a separate result since it shows that women are subject to
more labour market transitions; women's employment patterns are less stable than men's
even when controlling for a number of explanatory variables.
Figure 18: Goodness of t: actual vs predicted monthly EN hazard for men by age
To conclude this section, let us now take a look at Figures 18 to 21. These four gures
compare actual hazard rates to those predicted by my regression model and can be used
to assess the goodness of t or within-sample prediction quality of the model. There is of
course a lot of noise caused by small cell sizes (especially at older ages for the exit hazard and
at younger ages for the return hazard) which is deliberately not modelled since it does not
appear to be systematic, but the general shape of the hazard as well as the two genuine peaks
13exp(1:4303) gives the exit hazard ratio of female movers compared to female stayers, 1=exp( 1:4009)
the return hazard ratio.
48Predicted median transition ages
Exit Men Women
Actual 53.4 50.5
REF: Predicted at sample averages 53.6 51.2
2/3 of experience  3.3***  1.6***
4/3 of earnings +1.6*** +1.2***
2/3 of benets +0.6  0.9
REF: With OP 53.5 52.5
Without OP +2.1***  1.5**
REF: Good health 54.2 52.4
Excellent health +1.4** +0.4
Fair health  1.0***  3.2***
Poor health  7.4***  7.4***
Very poor health  9.8***  8.1***
REF: With child/children 54.1 51.3
Without child/children  1.1  2.5***
Return Men Women
Actual 42.3 43.3
REF: Predicted at sample averages 42.6 43.3
2/3 of experience +1.2*** +0.6***
4/3 of earnings  0.5***  0.6*
2/3 of benets  1.3***  1.5***
REF: With OP 41.2 41.5
Without OP +0.3 +0.9***
REF: Good health 41.3 42.4
Excellent health +0.2 0.0
Fair health +0.7* +1.1**
Poor health +4.8*** +7.2***
Very poor health +5.4*** >+27.6***
REF: With child/children 42.9 43.3
Without child/children +0.4 +1.9
Table 3: How do selected explanatory variables change the predicted age by which 50% of
those who were employed (upper panel) or non-employed (lower panel) at age 40 make a
transition to the other state? Predictions based on the model with unobserved heterogeneity
(UH).
According to my predictions, 60.1% of women not working at age 40 and continuously in
very poor health have not returned to work by age 70, therefore the `>+27.6***' entry for
this group.
***: Statistically signicant at the 1% level compared to the reference category (`REF') in
the corresponding subpanel; **: 5% level; *: 10% level (Murphy-Topel standard errors; cf.
Appendix).
49Figure 19: Goodness of t: actual vs predicted monthly NE hazard for men by age
Figure 20: Goodness of t: actual vs predicted monthly EN hazard for women by age
50Figure 21: Goodness of t: actual vs predicted monthly NE hazard for women by age
at ages 60 and 65 are well predicted (although I have two smaller peaks at the birthday month
and the subsequent month rather than one big peak at the birthday month which is due to
the fact that, as already mentioned earlier on, I was not able to include single-month dummy
variables in the full model). When plotting the corresponding survivor functions (not shown
in the paper, although this result can be seen implicitly in Table 3), it can be seen that the
actual and predicted survivor functions are almost identical, also in replicating the discrete
downward jumps at ages 60 and 65. This is a further indication that while unsystematic
noise is not picked up by the model, the systematic component of labour market behaviour
is well predicted.
5 Summary and conclusions
In this paper, I presented the rst comprehensive analysis of older men and women's labour
market transitions in the United Kingdom. It is the rst study to analyse older UK women's
51labour market transitions and the eects of OP membership in detail, and also the rst to
assess the exact size of birthday eects, i.e., spikes in the exit rate from employment at
certain ages.
When looking at the empirical hazard rates out of and back to employment by age, I found
very strong evidence of birthday eects, again particularly for men but also, only somewhat
less, for women. The peaks at ages 65 and 60 are markedly bigger than in the literature,
both absolutely as well as relatively (i.e., divided by the average of the surrounding two time
intervals). For women, both peaks are important (and less marked) while men basically have
one major peak at age 65. The importance of these peaks appears to have risen over time
also within my own data. Whether one ever had children does not seem to be associated
with the empirical transition hazard. Members of OP schemes are more likely to return to
work than non-members.
In my regression analysis, I present several interesting ndings. First, marital status does
not seem to be a very important determinant of older people's labour market transitions in
the UK. Second, employment experience in younger years decreases people's exit risk and
increases the return probability, but the eects are not that large. Third, women seem to
face a generally lower transition risk in times of high regional unemployment. This may call
for further investigation. Fourth, the impact of health problems is very important and bigger
than found in previous studies. Fifth, OP membership has the expected eects for women,
but the size of the eects is not that large. For men, the eects of OP membership are either
dicult to explain (exit) or not statistically signicant (return). Sixth, having ever had a
child is associated with a lower labour market exit risk for women. Seventh, in line with
the literature, the earning potential is found to be not that important in inuencing one's
transition probabilities, but the benet entitlement is found to have an important impact on
the return hazard. This impact is larger than found in previous analyses.
The parameters of my specication of unobserved heterogeneity are all highly statistically
52signicant, but, similar to earlier results, it does not seem to matter a lot for the general
picture of the coecient estimates. Twice as many women as men are in the group with less
stable employment patterns (`movers').
A lot of research remains to be done, and there are many open questions. What can
we say about the importance of part-time work and self-employment among older people
in the UK? What is the role of earnings, benets, and assets of other household members?
How could we decompose the eect of non-labour income into genuine benet income and
asset income? How can we explain the odd eect of OP membership on men's exit|for
instance with a wealth eect? Why do women have fewer transitions in and out of work
when regional unemployment is high? Why does the small group of women who never had a
child have a higher risk to exit the labour market? Further research is necessary to address
these questions.
53Appendix A: Income regressions
In Table 4, I present the results of the FES income regressions. These coecients have then
been used on the BHPS to predict income in and out of work for each BHPS respondent.
Natural logarithm of normal Men Women
total personal gross income Working Not working Working Not working
Calendar time 0.0012 0.0020 {0.0038*** 0.0064
Calendar time squared {0.0022 {0.0074 0.0326*** {0.0145
Before (cf. note) {0.3351*** {1.5116*** 0.0757** {0.3791***
Age 0.0002 0.0031*** {0.0013*** {0.0017**
Age squared {0.0020*** {0.0041** 0.0039*** 0.0090***
Occ: employers/managers (large) 1.1976*** 1.5537***
Occ: employers/managers (small) 0.8519*** 1.1182***
Occ: professional (self-emp. and emp.) 1.1339*** 1.5522***
Occ: intermediate non-manual worker 0.8337*** 1.1512***
Occ: intermediate non-manual foreman 0.6793*** 0.9450***
Occ: junior non-manual 0.3748*** 0.5605***
Occ: personal service worker {0.1499*** 0.1902***
Occ: foreman manual 0.6502*** 0.8182***
Occ: skilled manual worker 0.4807*** 0.7606***
Occ: semi-skilled manual/own account worker 0.3591*** 0.5447***
Occ: farmers { employers 0.6252*** 0.9359**
Occ: farmers { own account/agricultural worker 0.2556*** 0.3022***
Occ: HM Forces 1.0651*** 1.2334***
Constant 5.3016*** 4.5087*** 4.7774*** 3.6356***
Number of obs 11,854 6,800 11,669 10,128
R-squared 0.3594 0.1881 0.3218 0.0480
Table 4: FES income predictions for working and non-working men and women. Income is
measured in January 2004 pounds.
***: Statistically signicant at the 1% level; **: 5% level; *: 10% level (standard errors
clustered by household ID).
 Time is measured in months since 1900.
 `before' is a dummy variable to deal with a structural break in the FES normalginc
time series between 1993 (up to which the FES referred to calendar years) and 1994{95
54(from which on it referred to nancial years). In my income predictions, I do not use
the coecient of before, i.e., I am predicting on a post-1993 basis.
 Age is measured in months.
 The occupational base category is unskilled manual.
 These predictions use data which I adjusted for ination as described in Section 3 of
this paper. The base month is January 2004.
55Appendix B: Standard error correction
When estimating a regression model where some of the explanatory variables have been
generated through other (so-called rst stage) regressions, the standard errors of the so-called
second stage will be underestimated. There are several estimators of corrected standard
errors. Greene (2003) presents the estimator by Murphy and Topel (1985):
V
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where V2 is the asymptotic variance matrix of the second stage, V1 the asymptotic variance
matrix of the rst stage, and C and R matrices based on derivatives of the rst- and second-






















If the rst and second stage models are estimated on dierent data sets, R = 0, leading
to the shorter expression
V
corr
2 = V2 + V2CV1C
TV2 (13)
In my case, the second-stage models are the hazard regressions (cloglog). I have two
OLS rst-stage regressions, one for earnings and one for benets. If there are two generated




























where C1 and V11 belong to the earnings regression, C2 and V12 to the benets regression.
The Murphy-Topel standard errors are somewhat larger than the uncorrected standard
errors. However, the increases are never huge. I present the Murphy-Topel standard errors
for both models, for the one without unobserved heterogeneity as well as for the one with.
It is important to note that in the latter case these standard errors are not consistent but
since there is no commonly used consistent estimator of the standard errors for models with
generated regressors and Heckman-Singer type unobserved heterogeneity (cf. Meghir and
Whitehouse 1997: 341), I still present them.
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